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Who Will Gain and Who Will Lose Influence under 
Different Electoral Rules1 
Seymour Spilerman and David Dickens 
University of Wisconsin 
Electoral reform has periodically been an issue of immense impor- 
tance, and as long as the potential for crisis remains, this issue is 
certain to recur. What would constitute an electoral crisis is, fore- 
most, an indecisive contest, and, secondarily, a failure by the elec- 
toral vote winner to capture a plurality of the popular vote. A 
number of proposals for electoral reform have been advanced, rang- 
ing from simple alterations of the present Electoral College system 
to comprehensive reformations such as adopting a district plan, pro- 
portional division of the electoral vote, or direct popular election of 
the president. In this paper we investigate how the impact of various 
social groups on the outcome of a presidential contest would be 
altered under each of the reform proposals. A simulation methodology 
is used, with baseline data on group voting obtained from the 1960 
contest between Kennedy and Nixon. Our results indicate that, in 
comparison with the popular vote, the Electoral College advantages 
the following population groups: large-state residents, metropolitan 
area residents, Negroes, Catholics, and possibly low-income persons. 
The district and proportional plans, by generally disadvantaging 
these populations relative to the popular vote, would build a reverse 
bias into the electoral system. 
INTRODUCTION 
A matter of perennial concern to Americans involves the operation of 
our electoral system. We are a society committed to the norm of selecting 
the most popular candidate, and dread the possibility that the electoral 
arrangement-the way by which popular votes are aggregated-will deny 
the presidency to someone who has captured a majority or a plurality of 
the vote. Even worse, under the present system an election may be incon- 
clusive, in which case the decision will be made by 43 5 men who are 
not bound by the popular vote.2 Indeed, such fears are not without 
1 The research reported here was supported by funds granted to the Institute for 
Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin by the Office of Economic 
Opportunity pursuant to provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. We 
also acknowledge computation funds from NICHD grant 1-PO1-HD05876. The con- 
clusions are the sole responsibility of the authors. We wish to thank Harriet Zucker- 
man for her comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
2 Should no presidential candidate receive a majority of votes in the Electoral College, 
the House of Representatives would select a president from among the three candi- 
dates having the highest numbers of electoral votes. Each state, regardless of its size, 
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substance, since electoral crises have occurred a number of times in our 
history.3 
Prompted by these crises, there have been several attempts during the 
preceding two centuries to reform the electoral process. As early as 1816, 
Senator Abner Lacock of Pennsylvania proposed an arrangement provid- 
ing for selection of the president by the popular vote. While this and 
subsequent attempts to abandon the Electoral College did not reach 
fruition, the recent Ninety-first Congress, stimulated by the fear of an 
indecisive contest in 1968 due to the candidacy of George Wallace, seemed 
genuinely intent upon altering the electoral law. House Joint Resolution 
681, calling for direct election of the president and vice-president, was 
passed by a vote of 339 to 70. Although this resolution did not pass in 
the Senate, the issue of reform remains very much a matter of national 
concern, certain to be raised in the course of a close contest. 
Direct popular election of the president is only one of several arrange- 
ments that have been considered. Proposals have also been advanced to 
(a) retain the essential features of the Electoral College, introducing only 
minor modifications to ameliorate its worst defects, such as eliminating 
the hazard of the "faithless elector" by automatically validating the 
popular vote in a state; (b) retain the winner-take-all orunit-rule feature 
of the present system, but change the electoral unit from the state to 
the congressional district; or (c) apportion a state's electoral vote among 
the candidates in proportion to their popular votes. These are the main 
principles which have been enunciated as a basis for electoral reform; 
specific proposals contain many variations on these themes. 
In two respects direct election of the president is the most appealing 
alternative. The rule would be simple to comprehend and it is consistent 
with the principle of selecting the most popular candidate. There are, 
however, some serious drawbacks to this electoral arrangement. First, the 
popular vote may fail to provide a decisive outcome to a presidential 
contest. In terms of the popular vote (though not in terms of the Electoral 
College tally), we have witnessed several very close elections in recent 
decades. With the advent of sophisticated polling techniques, which pro- 
would cast one vote. In terms of 1968 figures, it is possible for 26 states with a 
population of 31 million to outvote 24 states with a combined population of 149 
million, or for 76 representatives from 26 states to elect a president in a House of 
435 representatives (U.S., Congress, House 1969, p. 475). 
3 In three instances a candidate who failed to receive a plurality of the popular vote 
was elected president. In 1824, Andrew Jackson, while capturing a plurality of the 
popular and electoral vote, did not receive a majority of the electoral vote and was 
defeated in the House. In 1876, Samuel J. Tilden received 50.9% of the popular vote; 
yet Rutherford B. Hayes became president with 185 electoral votes to Tilden's 184. In 
1888, Benjamin Harrison obtained 10,000 fewer votes than his opponent, Grover 
Cleveland, yet won an electoral majority. For additional details see Sayre and Parris 
(1970, pp. 29-32). 
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vide feedback to the candidates during the course of a campaign, allowing 
modifications in their appeals, it is probable that future elections will be 
close contests with even greater regularity. This would increase the fre- 
quency of challenges and recounts and, at a minimum, delay validation 
of the outcome.4 
The Electoral College has been viable in close popular contests because 
challenges and recounts are localized by state boundaries, and the majority 
of state results in any presidential campaign are not very close. Conse- 
quently, while a recount may be requested in New York or in Illinois, the 
results elsewhere may not warrant a challenge. This insulation of geo- 
graphic units has meant that attention need be focused on validating 
only a few contests. Moreover, if a shift in outcome in these states will 
not alter the Electoral College result, then the recount of even these 
contests becomes an academic exercise. By comparison, under direct popu- 
lar election, interest in a recount would not be limited to the few states 
with close outcomes. Wherever an additional vote were found it would 
contribute to the total electoral tally for a candidate, so the location of 
even a few votes in scattered districts could alter the decision in a tight 
popular contest.5 Indeed, in the 1960 election, a change of a single vote 
from Kennedy to Nixon in less than half the polling places would have 
reversed the popular mandate. 
A second issue concerns the benefits which can accrue from electoral 
fraud. A presidential contest carries major consequence for many interest 
groups including the political parties. Considering that there are 160,000 
polling places in the nation, it is nearly impossible to prevent all instances 
of electoral irregularity. If American presidential elections have been rela- 
tively clean, it is because the returns from fraud are low in most locales. 
Particularly in one-party states, where the opposition is poorly organized 
and least able to prevent vote manipulation, the motivation toward engag- 
ing in fraud has been weak. Localization of electoral units eliminates any 
benefit from piling up votes once a majority is assured. Under direct elec- 
4 To illustrate the difficulty with obtaining consistent counts, Theodore H. White 
(U.S., Congress, Senate 1970b, p. Z9), in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Com- 
mittee, stated: "It may amuse you to know in all the years since [1960] I have never 
been able to get an official count of John F. Kennedy's margin over Richard Nixon. 
One count says 113,000, the Clerk of the House says 119,450; there is another count 
of 112,000, another count of 122,000." 
5 In testimony before the Judiciary Committee, Charles Black indicated one likely 
adaptation in campaign strategy under direct election: "It would become the duty 
of the manager of anybody's campaign that might be advantaged by a recount to 
search very carefully in good faith for fraud, irregularity, and the sort of technical 
objections to voting that you refer to, so that even without those willful obstruction 
elements, I should think that in a close election, it would be almost inevitable that 
the vote everywhere would be scrutinized and contested, and every possible irregu- 
larity sought after, whereas, under the present system, it usually does not matter 
and people just do not bother with it" (U.S., Congress, Senate 1970c, p. 44). 
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tion, however, since the geographic origin of a vote no longer would be 
material, an impetus would be created in every backwater county to alter 
the vote tally. For these reasons, despite the intuitive appeal of a popular 
vote decision rule, there are difficulties with this plan. 
Any alternative to direct election must permit some possibility that the 
electoral process will produce a different outcome from the popular vote. 
What can be secured at this cost, especially if electoral districts are estab- 
lished under a unit rule, are segregation of the results from different 
constituencies (thereby reducing the magnitude of the problems enumerated 
above) and magnification of the popular vote (which permits close popu- 
lar contests to appear decisive in the electoral tally).6 The number of 
districts established is relevant to this trade-off: the greater this number, 
the more likely that the decision from aggregating the unit outcomes will 
be the same as the popular vote. On the other hand, increasing the num- 
ber of districts reduces the magnification of the popular vote. Conversely, 
having few districts will mean large magnification but also a significant 
possibility that the electoral result will contradict he popular vote. 
The way in which the magnification varies as a function of the number 
of electoral units is illustrated in table 1. Columns 1 and 2 present the 
proportions of the popular vote received by each major-party candidate 
from 1948 to 1968. In column 3 the proportion of the Electoral College 
tally recorded by the popular vote winner is reported, while column 5 
shows the proportion of congressional districts captured by this candidate. 
These entries indicate that the Electoral College (containing, on average, 
49 voting units) produces a greater magnification of the popular vote 
than the district plan (containing, on average, 437 electoral units). In- 
terestingly, the district plans, along with proportional division of the 
electoral vote, would have awarded the 1960 contest to Richard Nixon, 
while the Electoral College decision was consistent with the popular result. 
This is a fluke, however. In so close a contest there is a substantial prob- 
ability that any electoral rule, other than the popular vote, would have 
selected a minority president. 
While the above factors are central to the evaluation of any reform 
proposal, they ignore the Realpolitik considerations involved in changing 
the electoral system. The topics discussed so far derive from a voting 
model which conceptualizes the electorate as an undifferentiated mass of 
persons, rather than as urban and rural folk, Negroes and WASPS, 
6 Many critics of the direct election plan are sympathetic to this exchange. For 
instance, Kristol and Weaver (U.S., Congress, Senate 1970b, p. 10) have written: 
"In a very close election, after all, any method for deciding the winner is open to 
criticism and doubt. Indeed, it is at least arguable that, with respect to close elec- 
tions, the most important virtue of a system for deciding the winner is the clarity 
and decisiveness with which the verdict is rendered. And, in this respect, the Electoral 
College is not without its value." 
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workers and employers. Yet, as voting studies consistently show (e.g., 
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960), each of 
these groups has a characteristic propensity to prefer a particular party 
(although there is certainly variation from election to election reflecting 
the issues and personalities involved). These social groups, moreover, 
tend to be concentrated in particular cities and states, with the result 
that many geographic locales have become identified with a characteristic 
set of political interests and a traditional leaning toward one of the major 
parties. Since the alternative rules would aggregate the local propensities 
differently, possibly diluting or enhancing a group's impact, the concern 
over the specifics of electoral reform is, to a great extent, a concern over 
how the influence presently wielded by each population group would 
be altered. 
These parochial issues are quite evident in congressional debates on 
electoral reform and in interpretative press accounts which detail the 
features of specific proposals. As examples, it has been argued that under 
direct election the influence of smaller states would be enhanced (Sayre 
and Parris 1970, p. 71), but also that the impact of these states would be 
diminished (Wides and Stotlar 1970); that "direct popular vote would 
give greater influence to the major urban cities" (testimony of Senator 
Dominick [U.S., Congress, Senate 1970a, p. 9]), yet "the metropolis would 
lose its most important point of leverage in the total political system" 
(Sayre and Parris 1970, p. 72); that "black people and other minorities 
would lose a distinct advantage" under direct election (Rev. Channing 
Phillips, quoted in Newsweek [1968, p. 23]), but also that "to compensate 
for their loss of big city influence, [the Negroes'] nationwide strength 
would be pooled instead of washed out in winner-take-all e ections state 
by state" (Newsweek 1968, p. 24). It is our intention to elucidate this 
matter of electoral influence. 
ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF A SOCIAL GROUP UNDER 
DIFFERENT ELECTORAL RULES 
Previous Research 
Despite the concern over who would obtain an electoral advantage, and 
the very evident confusion on this issue, few attempts have been made to 
estimate relative group influence under the alternative rules. One fre- 
quently cited study in which empirical estimates were derived is by 
Banzhaf (1968). He calculated a measure of "voter power" for residents 
of each state, based on a conceptualization of electoral influence as the 
probability of casting the decisive ballot in an election.7 Banzhaf reports 
7 To motivate the computations, Banzhaf (1968, p. 306) writes: "In any voting 
situation it is possible to consider all of the possible ways in which the different voters 
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that citizens in small and medium-sized states are disadvantaged under 
the Electoral College; Longley and Braun (1972, p. 115), reviewing 
Banzhaf's results, conclude that the disadvantage accrues primarily to 
residents of medium-sized states. 
Banzhaf was addressing the constitutional issue of voter representation 
in different s ates. Given this interest, it is understandable that the only 
information entering into his computations was state population size and 
number of electoral votes. In contrast, we are primarily concerned with 
socially defined population divisions and with the consequences of electoral 
reform for the influence of these groups. As we have suggested, the con- 
cerns that have been articulated reveal the salience of these divisions; 
they do not conform to the notion of an undifferentiated citizen which is 
employed by Banzhaf. Indeed, according to some investigators (e.g., 
Truman 1951), American politics, in its very essence, is interest-group 
politics. 
Recently, Longley and Braun (1972), and Yunker and Longley (1972) 
have addressed these more partisan questions within the framework of 
Banzhaf's formulation. They computed a "citizen voter power" score for 
several social groups-Negroes, persons of foreign stock, residents of urban 
and rural areas. The scores were obtained by multiplying each state's 
relative voter power, calculated by Banzhaf, by the proportion of the 
group's membership residing there. Thus, subject to the assumptions of 
Banzhaf's model, to the extent that a group is concentrated in states with 
high voter-power scores, its impact on an election will be magnified. 
We are critical of one of Banzhaf's fundamental ssumptions. His calcu- 
lations presume that every combination of votes in a state is equally 
likely; therefore a citizen's voter-power score, indicated by the proportion 
of vote combinations in which his ballot is decisive, is a function of only 
state population and number of electoral votes. In practice, the probability 
that an individual is pivotal will depend on other state characteristics 
besides population size. Some states consistently report a majority for a 
particular party, while others display little partisan loyalty. Intuitively, 
we expect a voter to have greater opportunity to cast a decisive ballot in 
a competitive state than where a one-party tradition exists. 
An analogous difficulty resides in the Yunker and Longley computa- 
could vote; i.e., to imagine all possible voting combinations. One then asks in how 
many of these voting combinations can each voter affect the outcome by changing 
his vote. Since, a priori, all voting combinations are equally likely and therefore 
equally significant, the number of combinations in which each voter can change the 
outcome by changing his vote serves as the measure of his voting power." In appli- 
cation to the Electoral College, Banzhaf takes into account the fact that casting a 
decisive ballot in New York means influencing more electoral votes than casting a 
decisive ballot in Rhode Island. 
449 
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tions,j which utilize Banzhaf's voter-power formulation. Their analysis 
ignores the fact that the electoral impact of a group is a function of how 
other district residents tend to vote. The importance of this factor is 
easily illustrated. Consider a state in which blacks comprise 10% of the 
population. If white residents characteristically vote Republican by more 
than 56%, then even if all black persons were to vote Democratic, they 
could not affect the election outcome. Irrespective of their voter-power 
score under the Yunker and Longley calculation, in practice their impact 
would be negligible. Thus, a group's electoral influence is very much a 
consequence of the traditional voting patterns of other residents in the 
districts where it is concentrated; to have influence there must be a 
realistic possibility of casting a pivotal vote. 
Design of This Study 
The approach we propose to follow in measuring electoral influence 
constitutes a sensitivity analysis. As a first step, county and congressional 
district data on the social and economic characteristics of the population, 
together with election data from a particular presidential contest, are used 
to construct county-level estimates of how different social groups voted. 
These estimates provide baseline information for a simulation study in 
which the party preference of a group is repeatedly altered. By aggregat- 
ing the resulting county voting patterns under each electoral arrangement, 
we can address the question of who will gain and who will lose influence.9 
The election from which the baseline estimates were calculated is the 
1960 contest between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy. Selection of 
this contest was dictated by several considerations. It is closest in time 
to the 1960 Census, which was our source of information on population 
characteristics; district-level data are most complete for this election, 
since comparatively few instances of congressional redistricting had intro- 
duced boundary changes; and the closeness of the popular vote makes a 
sensitivity analysis more interesting. 
8 Some of Yunker and Longley's calculations are deficient in another respect. In 
computing voter-power scores for ethnic and racial groups under the district plan, 
they assume that these groups are represented at the state proportions in each con- 
gressional district. Even as a simplification, we believe that this assumption is un- 
reasonable. 
9 As used in this paper, the term "electoral influence" refers to two interrelated 
concepts. In the narrow sense, a group is influential to the extent that a shift in its 
party preference will alter the electoral vote. The sensitivity analysis reported here 
is based on a formalization of this interpretation. In wider usage, a group is influ- 
ential if the candidates defer to its interests. Throughout the discussion we assume 
that a change in a group's impact in the narrow sense will produce a corresponding 
shift in its influence in the second usage. 
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The results from such an investigation will have to be interpreted in 
terms of the simplifications which were made. In the present study, since 
baseline information was obtained from a single presidential election, we 
cannot assess the extent to which our conclusions are idiosyncratic of the 
issues and personalities in that contest, as opposed to reflecting stable 
party preferences. Second, no attempt was made to incorporate "second- 
order effects." For example, the alleged promise by George McGovern in 
1972 to appoint black persons to high office in proportion to their rep- 
resentation in the population may have cost him the votes of white ethnics 
at the same time that it attracted Negro voters. Because of the complexity 
of second-order assumptions, we have not simulated such processes. 
A final simplification arose from neglecting local issues and the myriad 
of other factors which might encourage members of a group in one county 
to respond differently than their compatriots elsewhere. Our estimates do 
permit the partisan preference of a group to vary as a function of county 
characteristics; for instance, we expect high-income Catholics to be more 
Republican than low-income Catholics. We are limited, though, to making 
identical manipulations in every county from its initial values. 
The above qualifications uggest that the findings hould be viewed as 
providing a first approximation to the change in electoral influence which 
would result from adopting an alternative rule. Once data become avail- 
able from the 1970 Census, this analysis could be replicated using more 
recent voting patterns to ascertain how stable the biases of each electoral 
plan are with respect to different population groups. 
Voting Rules to Be Considered 
We investigate five electoral rules, representing the main arrangements 
that have been proposed. 
1. The direct election of president and vice-president.-Presently, the 
direct election plan appears to be the most popular alternative. Senator 
Birch Bayh, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments during the Ninety-first Congress, favors it. It has also been 
endorsed by the American Bar Association, the U.S. Chamber of Com- 
merce, and the AFL-CIO. This plan would abolish electoral voting, 
substituting in its place the national popular vote. 
2. The current arrangement.-We assume that the Electoral College 
would automatically validate the state popular vote. Such a modification 
was suggested by Representative Hale Boggs of Louisiana to eliminate 
the problem of the renegade elector. 
3. The Mundt district plan.-Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota 
proposed that each state's electoral votes be distributed among geographic 
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districts (which we assume here to be congressional districts). 0 A unit 
vote decision rule would prevail in each district. In addition, the candidate 
receiving a plurality of the popular vote in a state would obtain a bonus 
of two electoral votes. Consequently, the number of electoral votes allotted 
to a state would remain at the present value. 
4. The equal-representation district plan. Under this arrangement 
each congressional district would award a single electoral vote on the basis 
of the popular outcome. The difference between this rule and the Mundt 
plan is accounted for by the absence of the two-vote bonus for the state 
result. Here the formal advantage which the Constitution ow bestows 
upon small states in the Electoral College would be eliminated. 
5. The proportional plan. This alternative was introduced in the 
Ninety-first Congress by Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina. It provides 
for a division of the electoral vote in each state (remaining at the current 
level) among the candidates in proportion to their popular votes. 
Preparation of the Data 
The data preparation was fairly complex and warrants some discussion. 
Machine-readable census information for counties was obtained from the 
Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. For about 250 of 
the 435 congressional districts, the 1960 election results could be gen- 
erated by aggregating the county votes. To obtain comparable information 
on the remaining districts a number of adjustments were required. In 
large metropolitan areas-New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia-the 
congressional districts are subunits of counties. For example, New York 
City contains 19 congressional districts located within five counties. Where 
complete district-level information was available, these counties were re- 
placed by their districts as the units of observation. 
This substitution was necessary for two reasons. First, the congressional 
district is the electoral decision unit in two of the plans under considera- 
tion. Second, the metropolitan counties contain considerable internal 
heterogeneity with respect to population characteristics; failure to use 
smaller areal units in this circumstance could lead to poor estimates of 
the relationship between party preference and population characteristics. 
Unfortunately, district-level voting data are not uniformly available. 
In several states reapportionment destroyed comparability between the 
census enumeration unit and the electoral district. As a result, approxi- 
mately one-half of the districts in multidistrict counties are reported in 
the Congressional District Data Book (U.S., Bureau of the Census 1963) 
without 1960 election data. A regression estimate of the two missing 
10 In fact, Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, in Senate Joint Resolution 25, has 
proposed that congressional districts be used for this purpose. 
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election variables" (turnout rate and percentage Democratic12) was 
constructed, the predictors being percentage Negro, median income, per- 
centage foreign stock, and median education.13 For each district lacking 
voting data, the estimates were calculated by substituting that district's 
population characteristics into the regression equation. The results were 
then standardized so that the Democratic vote, summed over districts 
within a county, would equal the reported value for the county. 
With these adjustments our final data file consisted of counties when 
they could be aggregated into congressional districts, and county parts 
(congressional districts) when aggregation could not be accomplished. The 
following deletions were made from the data set: Massachusetts-consist- 
ing of 12 at-large congressional districts; Hawaii and Alaska, totaling 
three congressional districts, deleted because the regression predictions 
reflect relationships in mainland counties; Connecticut, Michigan, Texas, 
Maryland, Ohio-one at-large congressional district deleted in each state. 
This study therefore reports sensitivity analyses using the population in 
416 congressional districts,'4 not the full 435. 
SENSITIVITY OF THE ELECTION OUTCOME TO PREFERENCES OF 
DIFFERENT POPULATION GROUPS 
In this section we consider the impact which different social groups would 
have on a presidential contest under the alternative voting rules. Specifi- 
cally, using 1960 Census data to specify baseline values, we examine the 
sensitivity of the electoral vote under each arrangement to a shift in party 
preference by the following roups: 
States of different population size.-Much of the controversy surround- 
ing electoral reform has centered on the relative influence of large and 
small states. The central issues concern what advantage currently is 
enjoyed by residents in states of a particular size, and how this distribu- 
tion of influence would be altered under each of the proposed plans. 
11 One additional variable had to be estimated for the districts. Figures for percentage 
Catholic are available in the county data file but not in the Congressional District 
Data Book. For urban districts, the county value for Catholic populaticn was appor- 
tioned among the districts in proportion to each district's foreign-stock population 
originating in Catholic countries. Ireland, Italy, and the Spanish-speaking lands were 
used as indicators of the Catholic foreign-stock population. 
12 The votes for the Liberal Party in New York State and for unpledged electors in 
three southern states have been grouped with the Democratic Party vote. 
13 Since the missing-data problem mainly concerns urban districts, the observations 
in the regression were metropolitan districts for which both voting information and 
population characteristics are available. 
14 With one exception the districts are those existing in 1962. In Alabama the 1960 
boundaries were used in order to eliminate at-large districts. Alabama had nine 
House seats in 1960, one more than in 1962 following reapportionment. 
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Urban and rural areas.-In part, the concern over the state-size issue 
derives from a recognition that different values and interests prevail in 
metropolitan and in rural areas, and residents in each setting are com- 
mitted to perpetuating their own life styles (Wides and Stotlar 1970). 
Manipulating the popular vote from urban and rural locales will comple- 
ment the state-size analyses by providing alternate (and more direct) 
estimates of how the electoral impact of these populations would be 
affected by implementing a particular aggregation rule. 
Racial and ethnic groups.-Another basis of contention involves the 
fear by minorities that their electoral impact would be eroded under the 
reform proposals. It is believed (Bickel 1970) that, as a result of being 
concentrated in large-population states, ethnic and racial groups currently 
wield influence disproportionate o their numbers in presidential politics. 
We present results from manipulating the partisan preferences of blacks, 
Catholics, and other white persons. 
Different income strata.-It has also been suggested (Sayre and Parris 
1970, p. 73) that a shift may occur in the relative electoral strength of 
different income strata. Such change could redirect executive policy on 
economic issues; for example, if the influence of low-income persons were 
diluted, support for welfare legislation might be adversely affected. While 
this issue is related to the preceding topics, in particular to the Negro 
manipulations, it involves many more persons and a different population 
distribution among counties than was previously the case. We investigate 
the electoral influence of low- and high-income persons under the alterna- 
tive plans. 
States of Different Population Size 
The prevalent view is that the impact of large states on a presidential 
contest is enhanced under the Electoral College system, and therefore is 
greater than can be accounted for by population size alone. For instance, 
according to the Bar Association of the City of New York (1967, p. 4), 
quoted in Banzhaf (1968): "XVhile the ratio of electoral votes to popula- 
tion is such that it would seem that the system favors residents of . . . 
sparsely populated states the most, and . . . heavily populated states the 
least, the practice of giving all of a state's electoral votes to the winner 
of its popular vote, by however small a plurality, has in fact contributed 
to the parties' selecting their candidates and directing their campaigns 
with a view toward affecting the outcome in the large industrial states." 
Calculations performed by Banzhaf (1968), using a very different model 
of voter influence from our own, support the contention that residents in 
large states enjoy an electoral advantage. 
The manipulations we report investigate the sensitivity of the electoral 
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tally to a shift in the popular vote from its 1960 values in different 
constituencies. To ascertain the electoral vote response we first define 
three state size categories: large states-the 11 largest, each having more 
than 12 electoral votes; small states-the 18 smallest, each having six or 
fewer electoral votes; intermediate-population states- 18 in number, rang- 
ing in size from seven to 12 electoral votes. 
WVe assume in our computations that an increase or a decrease in per- 
centage Democratic in a county from its 1960 value by an identical 
percentage of the opposing vote is equally difficult to produce. For instance, 
if a district voted 70% Democratic in 1960, we consider a 10% decrease 
-to 63%-as difficult to obtain as a 10o% conversion among Republican 
voters-which would increase the Democratic tally to 73%. 
Although we speak of the relative influence of voters in states of dif- 
ferent sizes, the manipulations must be performed on districts, since two 
of the reform plans would use this electoral unit. There is little reason to 
expect.that a change in voting behavior would occur in a uniform manner 
in all districts within a state; nevertheless, we will make this simplifying 
assumption. Lacking information about local contests, or party traditions 
in different communities, we alter the popular vote in each district from 
its 1960 value by an identical percentage amount. The state results, in 
turn, are derived by aggregating the effects from these local perturbations. 
More precisely, the manipulations herein are described by the following 
equations: 
Dc2 =fo%Dc + a(1 - %Dcj) (la) 
9 %D, + a(%%Del), (ib) 
where %Dc1 denotes percentage Democratic in a congressional district 
before manipulation (1960 value), %oDc2 represents the corresponding 
value subsequent to manipulation, and a indicates the percentage size of 
the induced shift in the popular vote. Equation (la) is employed to create 
a shift in the direction of increased Democratic voting; equation (lb) is 
used (with negative a) to simulate a popular vote change toward greater 
Republican voting. The values of a used in the simulation were a -+.04, 
-+.08, -.12 -+.16 +.20. 
These manipulations were applied separately to congressional districts 
in the states in each population size category. The results for large- 
population states are reported in table 2. The entries in the center row, 
corresponding to a 0, present baseline information: the 1960 election 
results aggregated according to the different electoral rules. The figures 
in column 1 show the popular vote change produced by manipulations 
of various sizes on the voting preferences of large-state residents. For 
instance, were 20% of Democratic voters in each district in large states 
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TABLE 2 
STATE-SIZE MANIPULATIONS: PERCENTAGE DEMOCRATIC VOTE UNDER DIFFERENT 
ELECTORAL RULES 
LARGE-POPULATION STATES* 
Direct Mundt Equal 
Election Electoral District District Proportional 
(Popular Colleget Plant Plant Plant 
Vote) (N = 510) (N = 510) (N = 416) (N = 510) 
MANIPULATION (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
a =-.20 .438 .222 .290 .283 .453 
a = -.16 .451 .222 .322 .322 .464 
a = -.12 .463 .222 .351 .358 .474 
a = -.08 .476 .222 .380 .394 .485 
a =-.04 .488 .331 .422 .435 .495 
a= 0 .501 .559 .473 .474 .506 
a = .04 .513 .665 .525 .529 .516 
a = .08 .526 .714 .561 .567 .526 
a = .12 .538 .739 .606 .618 .536 
a = .16 .550 .739 .645 .666 .547 
a = .20 .563 .739 .696 .728 .557 
NOTE.-Alaska, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia were deleted from the analysis. * Eleven states, each with more than 12 electoral votes. 
t A single at-large district in each of the following states was deleted: Connecticut, Michigan, 
Texas, Maryland, Ohio. 
to shift to the Republican column, the national percentage Democratic 
popular vote would change from .501 to .438. From the entries in the 
other columns it is apparent that this same manipulation will produce 
electoral vote shifts of greater magnitude under all but the proportional 
plan. 
The effect of these manipulations under the different plans can be seen 
more clearly by tabulating the cumulative electoral vote change. For 
large states this information is presented in table 3. We see, for example, 
that corresponding to an increase of .062 percentage points in the per- 
centage Democratic popular vote (produced by a 20%o reduction in Re- 
publican voting in large states), the electoral vote change is .223 per- 
centage points under the Mundt plan, .254 under the equal representation 
district plan, and .051 under proportional division. The magnification 
effects of the district plans are evident from these calculations, while the 
proportional plan appears to reduce slightly the margin of change in the 
popular vote. 
The response under the Electoral College rule is of a different order. 
The magnification produced by this arrangement is so great that all large 
states are already in the column of one party when a equals .12 in magni- 
tude. Additional change, in response to larger manipulation, therefore is 
not possible. In passing, we note that one reason for greater magnification 
in the Electoral College than under the district plans is that states are more 
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TABLE 3 
STATE-SIZE MANIPULATIONS: CUMULATIVE CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE DEMOCRATIC VOTE 
LARGE-POPULATION STATES 
Direct Mundt Equal 
Election Electoral District District Proportional 
(Popular College Plan Plan Plan 
Vote) (N_ 510) (N = 510) (N =416) (N= 510) 
MANIPULATION (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
aX =-.20 -.063 -.183 -.191 -.053 
a =-.16 -.050 -.151 -.152 -,042 
a =-.12 -.038 -.122 -.116 -.032 
a =-.08 -.025 -.337 -.093 -.080 -.021 
aX =-.04 -.013 -.228 -.051 -.039 -.011 
a 0 
a= .04 .012 .106 .052 .055 .010 
a = .08 .025 .155 .088 .093 .020 
a= .12 .037 .180 .133 .144 .030 
a= .16 .049 .172 .192 .041 
aC .20 .062 .223 .254 .051 
SOURCE.-Data are from table 2. 
competitive electoral units than are congressional districts. Districts tend to 
be relatively homogeneous in their social composition and can therefore ex- 
hibit extreme partisanship; states, by contrast, especially large states, often 
combine districts with different political leanings, and these differences 
cancel each other, making for close elections and competitiveness. This 
situation is illustrated in figure 1, which presents the distributions of 
states and congressional districts by percentage Democratic in 1960. It is 
apparent that the districts are considerably more extreme than states in 
their degree of partisan support. 
To obtain magnification scores the figures in table 3 were processed as 
follows: first, ignoring signs, the two values in each column which cor- 
respond to a manipulation of the same magnitude were summed; second, 
the resulting entries in each row were divided by the popular vote figure 
for the row. The reason for the first transformation is that we are un- 
interested in distinguishing between the effects produced by an increase 
or a decrease in the popular vote for a party; to a large extent such bias 
simply reflects the proportion of electoral units initially in its column. 
The second calculation standardizes the electoral vote change by the 
popular vote shift, enabling the magnification effects to be compared 
more easily. 
For large-population states the results of these computations are pre- 
sented in the upper panel of table 4. Analogous calculations were carried 
out for small and medium-sized states. The magnification scores obtained 
by manipulating the popular vote in those states are reported in the 
second and third panels of table 4. Each entry indicates the change in 
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electoral vote, relative to a popular vote shift produced in the indicated 
manner. For instance, a 4% alteration in the party preference of small- 
state inhabitants (a - .04) would create an Electoral College vote change 
that is 6.95 times as great as the corresponding shift in the national 
popular vote. 
When we compare the Electoral College magnifications for large and 
small states it is evident that, with respect to small shifts in popular vote, 
the magnification is considerably greater for large states. Although the 
advantage seems to disappear under the largest manipulations, this is 
purely illusory. Recall from table 3 that almost all large states had changed 
partisan preference by 4 _ 4.08, and all had the same preference by 
ae i.12; thus, the values in this column corresponding to greater vote 
shifts have no teas grent. We therefore conclude that the Electoral 
College provides a significant advantage to residents of large-population 
states; indeed, at the smallest manipulation a unit change in the popular 
vote will produce twice the response in the Electoral College tally if it 
originates in large states than in small ones (magnification 13.38tversus 
6.95). As a result, although we begin from very different assumptions than 
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TABLE 4 
STATE-SIZE MANIPULATIONS: MAGNIFICATION OFTHE POPULAR VOTE 
Direct Mundt Equal 
Election Electoral District District Proportional 
(Popular College Plan Plan Plan 
Vote) (N = 510) (N = 510) (N = 416) (N = 510) 
Manipulation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Large-Population States* 
a= -+.20 1.0 4.15 3.26 3.63 0.83 
a = +.16 1.0 5.19 3.24 3.53 0.83 
a = +.12 1.0 6.92 3.41 3.58 0.83 
a = +.08 1.0 9.88 3.62 3.63 0.83 
a = +.04 1.0 13.38 4.17 3.76 0.83 
Small-Population Statest 
a = +.20 1.0 7.16 6.96 4.39 1.51 
a = +.16 1.0 8.33 8.21 5.18 1.51 
a? = +.12 1.0 8.29 8.46 5.49 1.51 
a = +.08 1.0 6.96 7.46 4.87 1.51 
a = +.04 1.0 6.95 9.94 7.31 1.51 
Medium-Population States1: 
a = +.20 1.0 4.95 4.67 4.43 1.19 
a = +.16 1.0 5.88 5.00 4.63 1.19 
a = +.12 1.0 6.73 5.09 4.52 1.19 
a = +.08 1.0 9.31 6.06 5.06 1.19 
a = +.04 1.0 8.96 5.27 4.30 1.19 
SOURCE.-Data are froni table 3 for large states and from similar computations for the other 
state-size categories. 
* Eleven states, each having more than 12 electoral votes. 
t Eighteen states, each having fewer than seven electoral votes. 
$ Eighteen states. 
Banzhaf (1968), we also believe that the electoral impact of large states 
would be eroded under direct election of the president. 
An even greater decrease in large-state influence would occur under 
the other proposed arrangements. The Mundt plan is the more detrimental 
of the district plans; if it were adopted small states would acquire more 
than twice the magnification of large states. A significant advantage 
would also accrue to small states under the proportional plan. This rule, 
incidentally, has a deflating effect for large states (magnification15 0.83) 
and would make close popular contests even closer in the electoral tally.16 
Lending credence to the preceding analysis, the figures for states with 
intermediate-sized populations largely fall between the results for large 
15 The magnifications do not vary because of the absence of a unit rule. The electoral 
vote change under this plan, in response to a popular vote shift, is linear. 
16 Evidence for this feature of the proportional plan may be found in actual election 
data. Comparing columns 1 and 6 of table 1, we see that in every presidential contest 
since 1948 the winner's electoral vote under proportional division has been smaller 
than his popular vote percentage. 
459 
This content downloaded from 160.39.33.214 on Sat, 21 Dec 2013 11:00:55 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Journal of Sociology 
and small states. The fact that electoral advantage under each rule, as 
defined by our magnification scores, appears to vary continuously over 
the state-size categories uggests that it is probably a stable phenomenon, 
not idiosyncratic of the particular contest from which the baseline in- 
formation was gathered. 
Urban and Rural Areas 
The concern which has been expressed regarding the different impact of 
votes originating in large and small states appears to derive from two 
distinct orientations. For some, the issue involved is that of equal rep- 
resentation: the extension of the one-man, one-vote principle to presi- 
dential contests (Banzhaf 1968). The other interest is more particularistic, 
such as the contention by Theodore H. White that large states possibly 
deserve to have greater impact on presidential politics to compensate for 
their underrepresentation in the Senate (U.S., Congress, Senate 1970b, 
p. 31). 
In the particularistic arguments, the state-size question often serves as 
a proxy for a different issue, the relative representation of the opposing 
interests and values of metropolitan and rural communities. This issue 
taps a major cleavage in our society, pitting commerce, big labor, and 
ethnically heterogeneous populations-with an orientation to social change 
and liberal domestic policy-against agrarian economic interests and the 
traditional values of rural and small-town America. 
We can investigate directly how the electoral influence of metropolitan 
residents and rural persons would fare under electoral reform, thereby 
complementing the state-size analyses. Our procedure is to apply the 
previous manipulations to counties which satisfy the appropriate urban 
or rural definitions, and then aggregate the popular vote according to 
each electoral rule. The difference between this study and the state-size 
manipulations is that formerly it was immaterial whether a voter in a 
state of a particular size happened to reside in an urban or a rural county, 
while the present formulation is sensitive to this level of detail. 
A county was classified as highly urban if its population was reported 
in the 1960 Census to be in excess of 90%o urban.17 This definition pro- 
vided the most successful delineation between major metropolitan centers 
and other locales. Rural and small-town places were defined as counties 
less than 20%o urban, or counties between 20%o and 29%0 urban with 
population density less than 25 persons per square mile. The rural/small- 
town definition served to exclude almost all counties which contain a 
17 Places of 2,500 or more are defined as urban in the 1960 Census. 
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city larger than 10,000 inhabitants. We therefore have two very different 
types of areal units with respect to the urban-rural dimension.'8 
Having eliminated all counties which are neither metropolitan centers 
nor primarily rural, we henceforth treated the retained counties as un- 
differentiated units with regard to their population characteristics. In 
particular, percentage Democratic in a county was used to approximate 
percentage Democratic in the population group of interest. Thus, all 
"urban" counties were considered 100% urban; all "rural" counties, 
100% rural. 
The manipulations described in the preceding section were repeated on 
the counties in each percentage-urban category. The derived popular vote 
was aggregated according to the alternative rules and then transformed 
following the steps outlined in conjunction with tables 2-4. The magnifi- 
cations of the popular vote under each electoral arrangement are presented 
in table 5, separately for urban and rural residents. 
TABLE 5 
URBAN-RURAL MANIPULATIONS: MAGNIFICATION OF THE POPULAR VOTE 
Direct Mundt Equal 
Election Electoral District District Proportional 
(Popular College* Plan* Plan* Plan* 
Vote) (N = 510) (N= 510) (N =416) (N = 510) 
Manipulation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Highly Urban Countiest 
a = +.20 1.0 8.49 3.38 2.98 0.85 
a= +.16 1.0 9.74 3.49 3.08 0.85 
a=-+.12 1.0 11.54 3.77 3.25 0.85 
a = +.08 1.0 12.71 3.98 3.34 0.85 
a = +.04 1.0 13.27 3.91 3.42 0.85 
Rural Countiest 
a = +.20 1.0 11.61 6.77 5.33 1.24 
a = +.16 1.0 9.98 5.59 4.26 1.24 
a = +.12 1.0 6.65 5.64 4.44 1.24 
a=-+.08 1.0 4.53 4.84 4.44 1.24 
a=-+04 1.0 7.25 4.84 4.44 1.24 
NOTE.-Alaska, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia were deleted from the analysis. 
* A single at-large district in each of the following states was deleted: Connecticut, Michigan, 
Texas, Maryland, Ohio. 
t Counties which are more than 90% urban. 
t Counties which are less than 20% urban, or between 20% and 29% urban and have population 
density less than 25 persons per square mile. 
18 The manipulations described below were also carried out using different definitions 
of urban and rural. Counties greater than 80%o urban were defined as urban; rural 
counties were defined alternatively as counties less than 20%S urban and as less than 
10%c urban. In all instances the results were virtually identical with those presented 
in the text. 
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The conclusions we draw from these analyses are identical with those 
which were reached with the state-size manipulations: the influence of 
large metropolitan centers is enhanced under the Electoral College (again, 
the decrease in magnification above a -+? .12 in the top panel results 
from the majority of states with large urban populations having the same 
party preference by this value), while the other arrangements would ad- 
vantage rural counties in the nation. Consistent with the findings from 
the state-size study, the district and proportional plans would favor rural 
areas and small towns even more than would adoption of a popular-vote 
rule. 
Racial and Ethnic Groups 
Another concern which has been articulated in the debate on electoral 
reform relates to a possible loss of influence by minority groups (Bickel 
1970; Newsweek 1968, p. 23). It is believed that under the Electoral 
College, as a result of their concentration in large states and in metro- 
politan areas, blacks and white ethnics enjoy an electoral advantage which 
would be eliminated under the reform proposals. Empirical support for 
this contention is mixed; Longley and Braun (1972, pp. 122-24) report 
that persons of foreign stock do, indeed, have greater influence in presi- 
dential balloting, but blacks are below the national average on their 
measure of voter power. 
In this section we compare the electoral influence of nonwhites, Catholics, 
and non-Catholic whites19 using the simulation approach. The methodology 
is somewhat more involved than was required by the earlier manipulations. 
Previously, we could identify the county or district value of percentage 
Democratic with the voting propensity of the group of interest in the areal 
unit. For example, percentage Democratic in "urban" counties provided 
an approximation of urban voting behavior in those counties, even though 
a minority of the residents were not classified as urban. However, this 
simplification cannot be made in the present analysis, since the ethnic 
groups often constitute small percentages of the population even where 
they are overrepresented. We must therefore mploy other methods to 
estimate county-level voting by the minority groups in 1960. 
In order to have some measure of the sensitivity of the electoral findings 
to our particular estimates of ethnic voting behavior, two models were 
used to generate the county-level figures. Both employ the techniques of 
ecological regression (Goodman 1959; Duncan, Cuzzort, and Duncan 
19 As a simplification, we made the assumption that the population in a county 
can be divided among nonwhites, white Catholics, and other whites. Since our data 
report the county populations that are nonwhite and that are Catholic, any overlap 
between these categories will reduce the proportion of "other whites." That is, we 
define proportion "other whites" as (1 - oNW - oCath). 
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1961). We first note that for any county the percentage Democratic vote 
(%D) may be written as 
%7D (%7oDNW) (%7NW) + (%oDcath) (% Cath) + (% Dow) (% OW) 
- %Dow + (%7DNw - %Dow) (%oNW) 
+ (7%DCath - %Dow) (% Cath), (2) 
where the second equation is obtained using the identity (see n. 19) 
%OW - (1 - oNW - %Cath). The variables %oDow, %IDNw, and 
%IDCath (percentage Democratic for other whites, nonwhites, and Cath- 
olics) are unobservable in our data set; however, under suitable assump- 
tions (see Goodman 1959 for details) estimates of them can be calculated. 
Model I.-In our initial model we assume 
,yDow - cl 
%a DNW -C2 (3) 
% DCath - C3; 
that is, the party preference of each ethnic group is constant across 
counties. Under this specification estimates of ethnic voting can be 
obtained by regressing 
%oD - a + bi (%oNW) + b2 (%Cath) + e (4) 
over counties. The resulting estimates are 
zz a G1 = a 
C2 = a+ (5) 
C3 -a + b2. 
In practice, this model was applied in a more flexible fashion than the 
above description indicates. First, the regression equation (4) was esti- 
mated20 separately for counties from each of the geographic regions, 
Northeast, Midwest, Far West, and South.21 Second, state dummies were 
included in each regional regression to adjust for characteristic differences 
20 A weighted regression procedure was employed, the weights being the voter turnout 
values in the counties. 
21 The states were grouped as follows: Northeast-Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, 
Indiana, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsyl- 
vania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin; Midwest-Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, 
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming; West-California, Oregon, and Washing- 
ton; South-Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, 
and West Virginia. 
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among states in voting patterns. Thus, our estimates are responsive to 
the different historical traditions of the regions and, within a region, per- 
mit an additive adjustment among the state voting patterns. Third, the 
estimates from these ecological regressions were compared with survey 
results on ethnic voting by region in 1960.22 Although the number of 
observations in the surveys is small when one is interested in tabulating 
ethnic voting by geographic region, the survey estimates for nonwhites 
appeared more reasonable than the ones from the ecological regression 
and were substituted for them.23 The regression estimates for the other 
groups were close to the survey values and were retained.24 
Model II.-We know that an individual's party preference is molded 
by many factors besides ethnicity, by attributes uch as income, occupa- 
tion, and educational attainment. County-level data are available for some 
of these variables and were used to construct estimates of ethnic voting 
which vary by this areal unit. For our general model we assumed the 
following determinants of ethnic voting: 
%Dow e + f(Medlnc) + g(%YoAgric) 
%DDcath - s + t(Medlnc) + u(%Agric) (6) 
%0 DNW 
- r + q(Medlnc). 
Medlnc denotes the county value of median income, and %oAgric indicates 
percentage of the labor force employed in agriculture. Conceptually, we 
would prefer that the income and industry variables were specific to the 
ethnic group, rather than being county figures. Lacking such data, we use 
the county figures, thereby implicitly assuming that the ethnic groups 
in a county have distributions on the income and industry variables which 
are identical with those of the general population, or that they respond 
more to the county context han to their own values on the variables. 
Equations (6) were assumed for the three nonsouthern regions, where 
Negro employment in agriculture is negligible. For the South, our model 
22 The following sources were consulted: Brink and Harris (1967), Polsby and 
Wildavsky (1971, pp. 21-24), and Axelrod (1972). Ethnic tabulations were also pre- 
pared from the post-1960 election survey conducted by the University of Michigan 
Survey Research Center. 
23 For nonwhites the regression estimates averaged to .85, while most surveys report 
that Kennedy obtained approximately 75% of the Negro vote. The estimates of Negro 
voting by region which we substituted are from Brink and Harris (1967, p. 75). 
These values were adjusted to compensate for the aggregate bias introduced by the 
state dummies so that the state-effect erms could be utilized. 
24 The regional means are: Northeast-.366, .754, .727 for %DOWx %DNW' %o?DCath) 
respectively; Midwest-.410, .811, .730; West-.383, .705, .725; South-.436, .746, 
.665. The value for a county is modified by its state dummy. 
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of the determinants of ethnic voting was modified by the inclusion of the 
%Agric term in the equation for nonwhites: 
%7Dow e + f(Medlnc) + g(%oAgric) 
%oDcath -s + t(Medlnc) + u(%o'Agric) (6') 
%DNw = r + q(MedTnc) + z(%oAgric). 
To estimate the coefficients in either (6) or (6'), the equations of the 
model are substituted into (2). Simplifying the resulting expression, we 
obtain, corresponding to (6), a relation of the form 
%D - a + b1(%oNW) + b2(%oCath) + b3(MedInc) 
+ b4( % Agric) (1 - 7oNW) + b5(% NW) (MedInc) 
+ b6 (% Cath) (Medlnc) + b7 (%XCath) (%oAgric) + e. (7) 
The analogous regression equation for (6') is 
%oD -a ? b1(%NW) + b2(% Cath) + b3(Medlnc) + b4(%Agric) 
+ b5(% NW)(MedInc) + b66(% Cath)(MedInc) 
? b7( %Cath) (%Agric) + b8(%NW)(%Agric) + e. (8) 
Estimates of the parameters for either model are given by 
ef a .U 
Equation (7) was estimated for each nonsouthern region, and (8) for 
the southern counties. State dummies were also included in the regressions 
for the reasons discussed previously. The equations for calculating Demo- 
cratic voting by the ethnic groups, constructed by this procedure, are 
presented in table 6. Examination of the entries suggests that the coeffi- 
cients are at least reasonable in sign. Both median income and percentage 
of the labor force employed in agriculture are negatively related to Dem- 
ocratic voting, irrespective of the ethnic group. The reason, incidentally, 
why the median income figures are frequently identical is that many of 
the interactions involving income in equations (7) and (8) were highly 
correlated with one of the main effect terms and had to be removed. 
Each deletion eliminates one degree of freedom in estimating the coeffi- 
cients, compelling terms corresponding to the same independent variable 
to be equated. 
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TABLE 6 
REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF COEFFICIENTS FOR CALCULATING COUNTY ETHNIC VOTE 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE* 
Percentage of 
Median Labor Force 
Income Employed in 
DEPENDENT Constant (X 10O4) Agriculture 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) 
Northeast 
%DOW 0.609 -0.347 -0.724 
% DNW 1.065 -0.347 
%DCath 0.915 -0.347 -0.877 
Midwest 
%Dow 0.451 -0.038 -0.129 
% DNW 0.855 -0.038 
%DCath 0.757 -0.038 -0.165 
West 
%oDOW 0.669 -0.364 -0.312 
%DNW 1.039 -0.364 
%DCath 0.975 -0.364 -0.577 
South 
%DOW 0.523 -0.153 -0.026 
%DNW 1.008 -0.711 -0.001 
%DCath 0.777 -0.153 -0.026 
NOTE.-A weighted regression was performned in each region, the weights being the county vote 
turnout values. * The regression equations from which these estimates were constructed also contained state 
dummies. 
Using the equations in table 6, together with county values for median 
income and percentage mployed in agriculture, we constructed an estimate 
of %DNWV, %Dc1ati, and %Dmw for each county.25 These estimates serve 
as baseline information on how the ethnics voted in the 1960 election. 
The vote preference for a group was then perturbed, in the manner 
previously described, but in accordance with the following equations: 
%Dc2 % DDc, + a(l- %DEG1) (%EG) (lOa) 
D,C 
- %D,1 + ? ( %oDEG1) ( %oEG). (1Ob) 
25 The predictions from these equations were adjusted slightly to ensure that they 
would sum to the observed Democratic vote in a county. Using the predicted values, 
we constructed an estimate of county percentage Democratic: %OD = (%oDow) 
(%OW) + (DNw) (%oNW) + (%oDCath) (%oCath). Since %oD is known for a coun- 
ty, each predicted percentage Democratic figure for an ethnic group (%DEG) was ad- 
justed by the amount (oD - 7oD). 
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The term %D,1 denotes percentage Democratic in the county before 
manipulation (1960 value), %D,2 represents the value after manipulation, 
%0 DEG1 is the regression estimate of Democratic voting by the ethnic 
group, and %EG equals percentage of the county population comprised 
by the ethnic group (nonwhites, Catholics, or other whites). Equations 
(10a) and (lOb) differ from their counterparts (la) and (lb) in that 
the group of interest no longer is assumed to be identical with the county 
population; the quantity %EG now explicitly appears as a variable. (If 
%EG 1, then %D,1 - %DEG1, and equations [10] reduce to [1].) 
As before, the "a" manipulation refers to change in the direction of higher 
percentage Democratic; the "b" manipulation refers to a vote change in 
the Republican direction (negative a). The values of a used in the 
simulation were .04, -+-.08, +.12, +.16, .20. 
To ascertain the sensitivity of the electoral plans to a change in partisan 
preference by an ethnic group, these manipulations were applied to all 
counties (and county parts) and the results aggregated according to the 
alternative rules. This procedure was repeated for each ethnic group. 
Table 7 presents the magnification values, obtained from Model II's 
estimates of ethnic voting in a county in 1960. 
Our results for the Electoral College run counter to Longley and Braun's 
(1972, p. 124) findings in one important respect. They report hat Negroes 
have less than average voter power, while we find a clear advantage to 
nonwhites, in comparison with "other whites" (first and third panels, 
col. 2). Indeed, except for the very smallest manipulation, nonwhites wield 
greater influence in the Electoral College than do Catholics. These mag- 
nification values also mean that under direct popular election both Negroes 
and Catholics would relinquish the considerable influence in presidential 
politics which they currently enjoy. 
With respect to the other rules, the magnification values indicate a 
slightly greater disadvantage to Catholics and Negroes under the district 
plans than in the popular vote. Under proportional division of the 
electoral vote Catholics would also experience a larger erosion in electoral 
impact than under direct election (magnification = 0.91), while the reverse 
is true for Negroes (magnification - 1.17). 
How sensitive are these results to the particular estimates we have 
employed of ethnic voting at the county level? To address this question, 
the preceding manipulations were repeated using the estimates from 
Model I. The resulting magnifications are not presented here because 
they are virtually identical with the values in table 7. In no instance 
would a conclusion reached from an examination of table 7 be modified 
by the scores obtained with the cruder, regional estimates.26 The fact 
26 A third set of estimates of ethnic voting was also used in the simulation. The 
equations in table 6 were modified so that the county estimates of percentage 
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TABLE 7 
ETHNIC-GROUP MANIPULATIONS: MAGNIFICATION OFTHE POPULAR VOTE 
Direct Mundt Equal 
Election Electoral District District Proportional 
(Popular College* Plan* Plan* Plan* 
Vote) (N = 510) (N = 510) (N = 416) (N = 510) 
Mlanipulation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Nonwhites 
a = ?.20 1.0 21.97 5.30 3.25 1.17 
a = ?.16 1.0 19.74 5.10 3.21 1.17 
a = ?.12 1.0 17.12 4.41 2.70 1.17 
a = ?.08 1.0 24.57 5.04 3.04 1.17 
a = ?.04 1.0 18.69 2.95 1.20 1.17 
Catholicst 
a = +.20 1.0 12.11 4.43 3.68 0.91 
a = +.16 1.0 14.43 4.47 3.43 0.91 
a = 4.12 1.0 12.80 4.13 3.31 0.91 
a = +.08 1.0 18.84 5.01 3.80 0.91 
a = +.04 1.0 21.04 4.88 3.38 0.91 
Other White Personst 
a = +.20 1.0 6.40 4.51 4.13 1.01 
a = ?.16 1.0 7.51 4.72 4.25 1.01 
a = +.12 1.0 9.23 5.06 4.45 1.01 
a = +.08 1.0 11.17 5.10 4.21 1.01 
a = ?.04 1.0 8.67 4.92 4.34 1.01 
NOTE.-Alaska, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia were deleted from the analysis. * A single at-large district in each of the following states was deleted: Connecticut, Michigan, 
Texas, Maryland, Ohio. 
t Data on Catholic population are from Inter-University Consortium for IPolitical Research, Uni- 
versity of Michigan. 
t Proportion "other white persons" is defined as (1 - perceptage nonwhite - percentage Catholic). 
that our findings are not sensitive to alternative, reasonable calculations 
of the unobserved county-level thnic voting patterns is quite important. 
It means that the errors which undoubtedly exist in the estimates of 
Democratic voting are unlikely to be responsible for the thrust of our 
findings. 
Different Income Strata 
A change in relative electoral influence among income strata could have 
enormous consequence for the fate of class-relevant legislation. Federal 
support for income redistribution programs such as FAP or for full- 
employment policies may vary according to the perceived electoral strength 
of persons in different income categories. 
Democratic for each ethnic group, when aggregated within a region, would sum to 
the regional value. This was accomplished by adjusting the constants in the equations 
to achieve the intended result. The magnifications obtained with the estimates from 
these adjusted equations hardly differ from the entries in table 7. 
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The Michigan data file on population characteristics in 1960 contains 
only limited information on the income distribution in a county. We are 
able, though, to subdivide a county's population into the proportion of 
families with income under $3,000, over $10,000, and between these 
figures, the latter to be termed the middle-income stratum. Our analysis, 
therefore, will examine the change in electoral influence among voters in 
these three earnings brackets which would arise from replacing the Elec- 
toral College by a different plan. 
Analogous to the decomposition employed to obtain estimates of ethnic 
voting, we note that percentage Democratic in a county can be apportioned 
among the income strata: 
%D =%D3-(%3-) + %D10+(%10+) + %DMI(%MI). (11) 
The proportion of voters whose families had incomes below $3,000 is de- 
noted by %3-; % 10+ denotes the proportion with incomes in excess of 
$10,000; and %MJ represents the proportion in the residual category 
(middle-income persons). The percentage Democratic figures for the in- 
come strata are unobservable in our data set and must be estimated. 
Utilizing the relation %MJ [1 - (%3-) - ) (%1o0+)], equation 
(11) may be rewritten 
%oD %oDmI + (%oD3-- %oDMI) (%3 ) 
+ (%oD10+ - oDMI) (%1o0+). (12) 
Following the strategy in the investigation of ethnic electoral influence, 
we compute alternative estimates of Democratic voting by the income 
strata to serve as our initial conditions. 
Model I.-In calculating the first set of estimates, we assume constant 
values of Democratic voting in a region by each income group: 
7o D3_ -cl 
%oDMI C2 (13) 
lo D10+ c3. 
Substituting this specification into (12), we obtain an equation of the 
form 
oD -a + b1(%3-) + b2(%010+) + e. (14) 
By computing least-squares estimates of a, b1, and b2 from the county- 
level data, the parameters (13) can be recovered using the relations27 
27 Analogous to the procedure in the ethnic investigation, separate regressions were 
carried out in each region with dummy terms for states included in the equations. 
The values of Democratic voting in a county therefore equal the regional estimates 
modified by the state terms. 
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c = + 31 
C2 a (15) 
C3 _a + 2 
Model II.-Our second set of estimates was computed from a more 
complex specification of voting behavior. We assumed the following deter- 
minants of Democratic voting in a county by the income strata: 
%D3 = e+f(%Cath) + g(oNW) + k(%,oUrban) 
'YoD-I q + r(%oCath) + s(%oNW) + t(%oUrban) 
(16) 
7oD,o+ =U + v(%oCath) + w(%joNW) + z(%oUrban). 
This specification permits income-group voting to vary by county accord- 
ing to the county values of the independent variables. Substituting these 
relations into equation (12) and simplifying, the relevant regression for 
calculating the parameters of the model is 
%D _ a + bl(%oCath) + b2(%NW) + b3(%oUrb) + b4(%3-) 
+ b5(%oCath) (%o3-) + b6(%7NW) (%3-) 
+ b7( %0Urb) (%o3-) + b&(%10+) + b9(%/oCath) (%10+) 
+ blo(%oNW)(%lo0+) + bil(oUrb) (%ol0+) + e. (17) 
Estimates of the coefficients in (16) are then given by28 
e=g++a~~^  ^- &+a +a^ q ~u bs a 
Jzbs +bi rr v-b9+bi (18) 
P 6 2 ? 2 w L) + $ 
i-37+ 3 ~t-3 z -ii+bs. 
Both the regional and county-level estimates generated from the above 
two models proved unsatisfactory. The regional estimates of Democratic 
voting by the income strata were inconsistent with the corresponding 
values from the Michigan Survey Research Center's post-1960 election 
survey, to which they were compared. In some instances the regression 
estimates differed by as much as 30 percentage points. For this reason, 
11 of the 12 regression estimates of regional voting were replaced by the 
survey values,29 although the state-effect terms were retained and the 
28 Separate regressions were performed in each region with state dummies present in 
the equations. 
29 The regression estimate for %D1o+ in the Midwest was retained. Based on N = 16 
persons, the Michigan postelection survey reports Democratic voting equal to .69 in 
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survey figures adjusted accordingly to compensate for the aggregate ffect 
of these dummy terms. Thus, our Model I estimates combine survey and 
regression results. 
The equations for calculating the more refined county-level voting 
estimates (Model II) are presented in table 8. With a few exceptions 
TABLE 8 
REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF COEFFICIENTS FOR CALCULATING COUNTY-LEVEL VOTING 
BY INCOME GROUPS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE* 
Percentage Percentage Percentage 
DEPENDENT Constantt Catholic Nonwhite Urban 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Northeast 
%D3_ 0.212 0.169 1.114 0.217 
%DMI 0.264 0.231 0.116 0.217 
%OD10+ -0.497 0.231 0.116 0.758 
Midwest 
%D3_ 0.297 0.380 0.148 0.017 
%DMI 0.503 0.237 0.497 0.017 
%D10+ 0.196 0.237 0.497 0.075 
West 
%D3_ 0.369 0.285 0.644 0.054 
%DMr 0.6 16 0.230 0.456 0.013 
%D10+ -0.174 0.230 0.456 0.054 
South 
%D3_ 0.408 0.176 0.326 0.105 
%DMI 0.496 -0.140 0.2 73 -0.206 
%OD10+ 0.048 3.136 0.2 73 0.376 
NOTE.-A weighted regression was performed in each region, the weights being the county vote 
turnout values. 
* The regression equations from which these estimates were constructed also contained state 
dummies. 
t Before adjustment the constants were (reading from top down) 0.427, 0.349, -0.727; 0.313, 
0.500, 0.163; -0.165, 0.694, -0.140; 0.457, 0.667, -0.493. 
the coefficients have the expected signs: percentage Catholic, percentage 
nonwhite, and percentage urban all have positive effects on proportion 
Democratic. Nevertheless, when the county estimates were checked for 
consistency with the Michigan survey values,30 some discrepancies ap- 
this category. The regression estimate, equal to .27, is more consistent with voting 
by high-income persons in the other regions. The regional values of Democratic 
voting used in the simulation are (from low- to high-income strata): Northeast- 
.49, .50, .31; Midwest-.35, .54, .27; West-.60, .57, .21; South-.49, .52, .50. 
30 Using the equations in table 8 (with original constant terms), percentage Demo- 
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peared. The equations in table 8 have therefore been modified from the 
regression calculation by adjusting the constant terms so that when the 
county voting estimates for an income group are aggregated within a 
region, they will sum to the survey value. Thus, our estimates vary by 
county according to the specification in equations (16), but the constants 
have been altered to produce consistency with the regional results. 
The magnifications for the income strata, obtained with the county 
voting estimates generated by the adjusted equations, are reported in 
table 9. Relative to the popular vote, the entries in column 2 reveal that 
TABLE 9 
INCOME-GROUP MANIPULATIONS: MAGNIFICATION OFTHE POPULAR VOTE 
Direct Mundt Equal 
Election Electoral District District Proportional 
(Popular College* Plan* Plan* Plan* 
Vote) (N _ 510) (N = 51a) (N = 416) (N 5=1 O) 
Manipulation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Low-Income Personst 
a = +.20 1.0 13.78 5.33 4.40 1.11 
a = ?.16 1.0 16.08 5.64 4.24 1.11 
a = +.12 1.0 12.78 5.17 4.16 1.11 
a = +.08 1.0 10.92 4.33 4.06 1.11 
a = +.04 1.0 18.92 4.61 3.86 1.11 
High-Income Personst 
a = +.20 1.0 7.88 4.78 4.49 0.92 
a = +.16 1.0 9.62 4.57 4.09 0.92 
a = +.12 1.0 9.00 3.93 3.81 0.92 
a = +.08 1.0 13.50 4.65 4.19 0.92 
a= +.04 1.0 12.83 2.57 2.36 0.92 
Middle-Income Persons? 
a = ?.20 1.0 6.49 4.03 3.62 0.98 
a = +.16 1.0 7.86 4.32 3.80 0.98 
a +.12 1.0 9.59 4.46 3.79 0.98 
a ?.08 1.0 11.40 4.89 4.22 0.98 
a =+?.04 1.0 14.16 5.12 3.95 0.98 
NOTE.-Alaska, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia were deleted from the analysis. * A single at-large district in each of the following states was deleted: Connecticut, Michigan, 
Texas, Maryland, Ohio. 
t Family income below $3,000 in 1960. 
t Family income in excess of $10,000 in 1960. 
? Family income between $3,000 and $10,000 in 1960. 
low-income persons enjoy a modest advantage over the other income 
strata in the Electoral College. The proportional plan would also provide 
cratic figures were calculated for the income strata in a county. For each group 
these values were weighted by the proportion of votes in the region that were cast 
in the county, and summed over counties to provide an estimate of Democratic 
voting at the regional level. 
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a small benefit o the poor (magnification - 1.11), while the district plans 
do not exhibit any consistent group bias. 
We have less confidence in these magnification scores than in the results 
of the preceding investigations. One reason is because the voting estimates 
had to be jerry-rigged, in the manner we have described. A second reason 
is that the Electoral College magnifications (though not the scores for 
the other plans) are sensitive to the baseline estimates of income-group 
voting. If the unadjusted constant terms are retained in the estimating 
equations, the magnifications indicate a larger advantage to poor persons 
under the Electoral College.3' In contrast, the regional voting estimates 
(Model I) produce magnifications in the Electoral College which suggest 
little systematic advantage to any income strata.82 While we believe that 
table 9 was constructed using the best available calculations of voting 
behavior by the income strata, these results nevertheless should be viewed 
as exceedingly tentative. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Electoral reform has periodically been an issue of immense importance, 
and as long as the potential for crisis remains, this matter is certain to 
recur. What would constitute a crisis would be, foremost, the failure by 
any candidate to secure a majority of the Electoral College vote. In this 
circumstance, selection of a president would be made in the House of 
Representatives where the popular preference could be disregarded. Even 
more likely, in the period before the Electoral College formally met, the 
minor-party candidate would attempt to exchange his votes for policy 
accommodations or high administrative posts.33 In either eventuality, 
weeks might pass before a president were chosen,34 and the outcome would 
derive from a private deal. The strain on the legitimacy of the incumbent 
during his term of office would be enormous. 
From the remarks in the introductory section it is evident that more 
radical reforms have been contemplated than merely removing this poten- 
31 In place of the entries in col. 2 of table 9, we have (reading downward) 13, 15, 
17, 12, 18; 8, 9, 9, 9, 12; 6, 7, 9, 11, 13. 
32Replacing the magnifications in col. 2, we have (reading downward) 14, 14, 13, 
11, 19; 9, 9, 11, 12, 21; 7, 8, 10, 12, 14. 
33 A Wallace position paper from the 1968 campaign discussed this very tactic (Con- 
gressional Quarterly Weekly Report 1968, p. 1812). 
34 According to current federal law: "The electors of President and Vice President 
of each state shall meet and give their votes on the first Monday after the second 
Wednesday in December." Also, "Congress shall be in session on the sixth day of 
January succeeding every meeting of the electors" (Peirce 1968, pp. 331-32). In 
1960 the popular election was held on November 8, the electors voted on December 19, 
and the ballots were counted in Congress on January 6, 1961. 
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tial for crisis (which could be accomplished by requiring a plurality rather 
than a majority of the Electoral College vote for confirmation).3 In 
part, the impetus for comprehensive change stems from a desire to elimi- 
nate state disparities in voter influence and, as a side benefit, avert the 
possibility of a second kind of crisis, one in which the election is decisive 
but the electoral-vote winner fails to acquire a plurality of the popular 
vote.36 In part, support for major electoral revision has constituted an 
attempt to alter the distribution of influence in presidential politics in 
favor of one's own constituency. 
We have commented briefly on some technical aspects of the electoral 
rules. We indicated that the direct election plan would be subject to certain 
abuses which are minimized when electoral constituencies are insulated 
and operate under a unit rule, as is presently the case. This is not to 
suggest that the greater problems created by fraud, vote recounts, and 
small victory margins under direct election outweigh the benefit from 
selecting the popular-vote winner (if the determination can be made in 
a close contest), only that there are real difficulties to be surmounted if 
this arrangement is adopted. On purely technical grounds we would advise 
against the proportional plan; this rule retains the disadvantages of direct 
election and, in addition, appears to deflate the margin of victory in the 
popular vote. 
Yet, the thrust of our analysis has been to assess the change in electoral 
influence among population groups which would result from replacing the 
Electoral College by a different system. We conclude that, relative to the 
popular vote, the electoral clout of large states, metropolitan centers, 
Negroes, Catholics, and, possibly, low-income persons is enhanced under 
the Electoral College. Adoption of direct popular election would reduce 
the impact of these groups on presidential politics. With few exceptions, 
the district and proportional plans would produce an even greater erosion 
in their influence. 
In the Introduction we reported that considerable disagreement exists 
concerning who would benefit under a particular electoral rule. While the 
confusion is abundant, it is not universal. There are groups which have 
correctly assessed the implications of each arrangement and have adopted 
positions consistent with their interests. For example, support for the 
Mundt district plan and for proportional division of the electoral vote 
35 Reforms of this nature have been proposed by Representatives Henry S. Reuss 
of Wisconsin and Hale Boggs of Louisiana. 
36 While certainly undesirable, this sort of mishap is unlikely to provoke a crisis of 
legitimacy. The popular election would have produced an immediate decision on the 
basis of established rules. Also, the winner in the Electoral College probably would 
not be far behind in the popular tally. Indeed, the popular vote might be a toss-up- 
precisely the circumstance in which the drawbacks of the direct election plan would 
be most prominent. 
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has come from the National Cotton Council of America, the American 
Farm Bureau, and the National Grange. On behalf of the proportional 
plan, John W. Scott of the Grange has written: "We wish the words of 
rural America to be heard as well as our voices. Therefore we feel that 
an amendment o the constitution to revise the present Electoral College 
procedure, as outlined in this letter, will permit our words to be heard" 
(U.S., Congress, House 1969, p. 231). Correspondingly, representing a 
highly urban constituency, the American Jewish Congress has advocated 
retention of the Electoral College (U.S., Congress, Senate 1970a, p. 525). 
In retrospect, one of the most perceptive comments concerning the opera- 
tion of the Electoral College was made by Alexander M. Bickel in testi- 
mony before Congress: 
I think it reasonably clear that the effect of the Electoral College system 
over recent generations has been that it . .. causes Presidential elections 
to be decided for the most part in the large, populous, heterogeneous 
states, where in turn block voting, as by minorities or other interest 
groups, is often decisive. No one, I concede, can offer mathematical 
proof that this is how the system has worked and will continue to work, 
but that is not very important. . . . Whether or not it may be in some 
part myth, it governs political behavior. The result has been that modern 
Presidents have been particularly sensitive and responsive to urban and 
minority interest. [U.S., Congress, Senate 1968, p. 544] 
With respect to the issue of equal representation, the fact that the 
Electoral College weighs the votes of different populations groups un- 
equally need not constitute sufficient reason for altering the election 
procedure. The crucial question concerns what we specify as the relevant 
system within which equal representation is sought. If consideration is 
restricted to presidential politics narrowly, then large states, urban centers, 
and ethnic minorities do indeed have greater impact under the Electoral 
College. However, if we broaden the system specification to encompass the 
federal government, we find that the very groups advantaged in presiden- 
tial politics are underrepresented in the U.S. Senate. Vhether these im- 
balances exactly cancel one another we cannot say, but we do believe 
that the distribution of influence in the legislative branch is a proper 
consideration, and as long as imbalances exist there, we find it difficult 
to justify eliminating compensatory imbalances in the executive branch. 
Ultimately, if one accepts the principle of equal representation, his 
position on direct election must derive from a judgment as to what 
constitutes the relevant system. What analysis can show is how advantage 
currently is allocated, and how this will change if the Electoral College is 
replaced. In light of our findings, it would not be unreasonable for the 
proponents of direct election to recognize that a substantial erosion in 
political influence would be experienced by urban groups and, in exchange 
for their acquiescence, to consider offsetting adjustments uch as eliminat- 
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ing seniority rules in Congress, which currently benefit rural constituencies. 
Related to this issue, some commentators have argued that new strategies 
will become available under direct election, and they will compensate for 
this loss of influence. While we cannot evaluate the variety of adaptations 
that might occur, we are able to address one which has been frequently 
mentioned. To quote Neal R. Peirce (1968, pp. 282-83): 
But what then of the "minority" groups-Catholics, unionists, Negroes, 
Jews, assorted ethnic blocs-[under direct election]? Would these groups 
lose a special privilege they enjoy today? The answer is clearly no. ... 
[T]hey would be able to transfer their voting strength to the national 
stage instead-and be just as effective there. . Negroes from Southern 
states like Georgia and Alabama would be able to combine their presi- 
dential votes with Negroes from New York, Illinois, and Michigan and 
thus constitute a formidable national voting bloc that the parties would 
ignore at their peril. 
Our analysis is relevant to this contention. The manipulations performed 
on the vote preferences of urban residents, Negroes, and Catholics simu- 
late precisely what would be expected from a "national voting bloc"-the 
tendency for individuals haring an identity to vote together irrespective 
of location. What we learn from these perturbations i that even if the 
members of each group were to vote in concert, their impact on presiden- 
tial politics would be reduced under direct election. 
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